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Liam Shields’ sufficientarian commitments mean that he should subscribe 
to a child-centered account of the right to parent. This point most likely 
generalizes: sufficientarians who acknowledge children’s full moral status 
must embrace a child-centered account of the right to parent.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One chapter of Liam Shields’s book Just Enough concerns justice in 
childrearing. Shields believes that an ability to provide an adequate 
upbringing usually protects custodians against being stripped off their 
right to rear a child, even if better custodians are willing to parent that 
child. To argue for this conclusion, he advances his own version of a dual-
interest account of the right to parent; an account that grounds the right by 
appeal to both children’s interest in parenting and prospective parents’ 
interest to rear. As a sufficientarian, Shields believes that children are 
entitled to a sufficiently good parent, rather than to the best available one 
and, given the importance of parenting for many people’s wellbeing, he 
also believes that adults are entitled to an opportunity to parent.
I agree with Shields’ conclusion that adequate parents cannot lose 
custody merely because a better parent is willing to take over. But I disagree 
with his argument for this conclusion. I explain why other dual-interest 
accounts of the right to rear – as well as child-centered accounts! – can 
show that, once an adequate parent has acquired custody, she or he holds 
1 I am grateful to Tim Meijers, two anonymous referees, and the editors of this 
special issue for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This project has received funding 
from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
Research and Innovation programme (Grant Agreement Number: 648610).
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it securely. Most importantly, I argue, Shields’ sufficientarian commitments 
mean that he should subscribe to a child-centered account of the right to 
parent. The last point most likely generalizes: sufficientarians who 
acknowledge children’s full moral status must embrace a child-centered 
account of the right to parent. The general form of the argument is:
P1. Children have full moral status.
C1. Therefore there is a strong prima facie presumption that one cannot 
claim legitimate authority over them by appeal to one’s own interests.
P2. Parenting is a form of exercising a very significant amount of 
authority over children.
C2. Therefore, there is a strong prima facie presumption that the right to 
parent cannot be grounded in the interests of the right-holder.
P3. So far, the most promising attempt to show that the presumption in 
C2 is overridden relies on the joint belief that justice requires equal 
opportunity to flourish/pursue life plans and that parenting is a central 
and non-substitutable element of full flourishing for some people.
P4. Shields denies both elements of the joint belief in P3 and does 
nothing else to show that the presumption in C2 is overridden.
C3. Shields must therefore be committed to a child-centered account of 
the right to parent.
More generally, even if children are not entitled to more than enough, it 
is false that others’ authority over them may be justified by appeal to the 
interests of those who exercise the authority.
2. THE CHALLENGE OF CUSTODY CHANGE
Imagine a child is well-settled with her biological or adoptive parents, with 
whom she has a loving, close, trustful and nurturing relationship; 
moreover, the parents provide adequately for this child‘s developmental 
needs and give her a reasonably happy childhood (I must bracket the 
enormous issue of how to establish who is an adequate, and who is an even 
better-than-adequate, parent). Now imagine that some people, who could 
do better on all these counts, express the intention to raise the child 
themselves. Is there a reason or perhaps even a duty of justice on the side of 
some agent, such as the state, to allow or enable the second set of adults to 
take over, against the current parents’ will? The resolutely negative answer 
yielded by common sense is worthy of philosophical attention: children 
  191
LEAP 5 (2017)
Sufficientarian Parenting Must be Child-Centered
are very vulnerable, they need parents in order to survive and thrive, and 
lack the authority to choose their own custodians. Moreover, custodians 
command an unusually high level of power over children. Some 
philosophers working on issues of justice in childrearing have considered 
whether, given these facts about children and childrearing, it can ever be 
permissible for suboptimal parents to be in charge of children‘s fates when 
better parents are available (Vallentyne 2002; Brighouse and Swift 2006; 
Hannan and Vernon 2008; Gheaus 2012; Brighouse and Swift 2014.) This is 
the literature about the grounds of the right to parent, and most of it 
discusses the question of how the right is acquired: (why) do adults who 
would make suboptimal parents have an entitlement to be parents? Shields 
contributes to this discussion, with a focus on cases of custody change 
rather than on cases of the acquisition of the right. That is, he aims to 
explain why it is impermissible, once a person already has the custody of a 
child and raises her adequately, to allow another person, who would (by 
assumption) make a better parent for the child in question, to become the 
legal parent of this child (Shields 2016: 22)2.
Shields is critical of both child-centered accounts of the right to parent 
– that is, of theories that appeal exclusively to the interests of children – 
and of existing dual-interest accounts – that appeal both to the interests of 
the would-be parents and to those of children – such as those defended by 
Matthew Clayton (2006) and by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2006; 
2014). He thinks that child-centered accounts cannot explain the 
impermissibility of custody change; therefore, he seems to assume that the 
strongest argument in favor of the dual-interest view is that it alone can 
address this challenge, albeit only imperfectly in the versions developed so 
far (Shields 2016a, 2016b). Shields’ argumentative strategy is to show why 
his own version of the dual-interest account yields more appealing results 
that existing versions.
Unlike Shields, I believe that, in fact, the custody change worry can be 
easily averted not only by dual-interest accounts, but also by child-centered 
accounts. Child-centered theorists can employ several strategies to explain 
why it is impermissible to allow a change in custody merely because an 
adult who would make a better parent for the child wants to take over. Most 
obviously, they can appeal to the interest of the child in continuity of care, 
which is such that the transition costs to a different parent are enormous. 
Indeed, so enormous that maybe child-centered theorists can employ this 
strategy in all or most cases when parents are adequate, i.e. have the moral 
2 As he puts it: “The particular question I wish to answer is ‘On what grounds can 
custodial parents usually be denied the right to rear?’” (Shields 2016a: 122).
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right to parent in the first place.3 How bad must one’s parents be for a child 
to be better off changing custodians?
But Shields also wants us to consider cases when a change in custody 
would really be better for a child – that is, when the cost of severing the 
relationship with the initial, adequate, custodians would be lower than the 
gains for the child. Assume that extraordinarily good alternative parents 
were available to adopt her.4 In such cases, child-centered accounts seem 
unable to explain why a change in custody is illegitimate. One answer to 
this is to bite the bullet and note that in these circumstances it is a lot less 
counter-intuitive that a change in custody is impermissible (especially if, 
indeed, only very rarely could the custody change to an extraordinarily 
good parent compensate for the loss of an established relationship with an 
adequate parent). This will not satisfy Shields, nor any of the dual-interest 
theorists who want to show that, independent of such empirical matters, 
adequate parents have a right to continue to parent.5 
However, there is a reason why a change in custody away from adequate 
parents is impermissible even when the child would really be better off 
with extraordinarily good parents. This reason is advanced by some child-
centered theorists (Vallentyne 2003). Children‘s interests are well served if, 
once acquired, the right to parent is securely held; that is, there is immunity 
to custody change, as long as the parent is at least adequate. Otherwise, 
only parents who are not too scared by the prospect of losing custody 
would volunteer for the role. But the prospect of losing the relationship 
with a beloved child is scary, and we know that good parents are loving and 
attached to their children. Therefore, those undeterred by the prospect of 
losing custody are not, in general, less likely to make very good parents6. 
So, even if a particular child, who now has an adequate parent, would, by 
assumption, be better off with a new parent, allowing custody changes in 
such cases would make most would-be adequate parents unwilling to 
engage in parenting. This would set back most children’s interests. This is 
3 Indeed, in their dual-interest account, Brighouse and Swift, too, give a lot of weight 
to the interest of the child in preserving the relationship with her parents, once established 
(2014: 96-97). The interest, on their view, is powerful enough that may justify even less than 
adequate parents to continue to have the child’s custody.
4 For this, see some of Shields’ other work (Shields 2016c).
5 Brighouse and Swift (2014: 97) employ an additional argument: they note that even 
in cases of abusive and neglectful parents – well below the adequacy threshold – it may be 
that taking the child in state custody and trying to place her with an adoptive or fostering 
family has poor prospects of success. But, I assume, Shields is interested in cases when a 
state has better records than existing states do for handling such cases.
6 At least, usually. There may be isolated cases of would-be extraordinarily good 
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a child-centered explanation why a change in custody should not be 
permitted merely because a would-be optimal parent is willing to parent a 
child who is already adequately parented. Being child-centered, it is also 
open to dual-interest accounts which, like Brighouse and Swift’s, give the 
child’s interests the primary role in the justification of the right to parent.
In other work, Shields provided a different line of reasoning, meant to 
explain why the worry concerning changes in custody can also emerge due 
to a requirement of equal opportunities to parent (Shields 2016c): Insofar 
as dual-interest accounts rely on the existence of a weighty, non-
substitutable, right-generating interest to parent, they must attribute the 
interest – hence the right – to all would-be adequate parents, whether or 
not these individuals actually happen to be the custodian of a child. As 
egalitarians, dual-interest theorists (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 2014; 
Clayton 2006) must also acknowledge that the distribution of the right to 
parent has to be regulated by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, 
meaning that adults who are already the custodian of a child have no more 
principled entitlement to enjoy the goods of parenting than those who are 
not yet custodians. In short, if would-be adequate parents have such a 
powerful interest in parenting, then they ought to have the same 
opportunity to have their interest satisfied. This means that the right to 
parent cannot be purely negative, namely a protection against interference 
with current custodians’ parenting their children. As Shields writes: 
“A negative right to parent would treat some people with the non-
substitutable interest in parenting, those who can produce biological 
children, very differently from others with that very same interest, 
those who cannot. It would not preserve equality of opportunity to 
fulfill their interest in parenting” (Shields 2016c: 9).
But this worry, too, can be dispelled, even if the right to parent goes 
beyond a mere protection, by appeal to a general negative right to continue 
one’s intimate relationship (Gheaus 2018)7. Consider an analogous case: 
we might have a very weighty, non-substitutable interest in finding a life 
partner. (Is there any reason to think that such an interest is less weighty, 
or more easily substitutable, than the interest in parenting?) At the same 
time, individuals have negative rights against being separated from their 
partners even in cases when there is a shortage of partners to marry, and 
even in cases when different individuals, out of no fault or choice of their 
own, have much fewer opportunities to find a partner.
7 Brighouse and Swift frame the early version of their account (2006) as an attempt 
to explain why only adequate parents have a right to enter the parent-child relationship. 
They seem to assume that it is not difficult to explain why parents have a right to continue 
the relationship with the child, once it has been established.
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3. SUFFICIENTARIANS SHOULD NOT ENDORSE A DUAL-
INTEREST ACCOUNT
I think that the most important accomplishment of dual-interest 
accounts lies elsewhere than in a unique ability to avert the custody change 
worry8: Their greatest advantage over child-centered accounts is that dual-
interest accounts alone are capable of explaining why it is wrong to deny 
would-be adequate parents a right to engage in, rather than continue, 
parenting. In Brighouse and Swift’s words: 
“No child has a right to be parented by the adult(s) who would do it best, 
nor do children as a whole have a right to the way of matching up 
children and parents that would be best for children overall. Both 
scenarios could leave perfectly competent parents missing out on the 
goods of parenting.” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 95)
As Shields (2016c) himself notes, dual-interest theorists appeal to a 
weighty and non-substitutable interest in parenting in order to explain 
why competent prospective parents are entitled to an opportunity to 
parent; they also presuppose an egalitarian principle of distributive justice, 
letting them conclude that we are entitled to equally flourishing lives 
rather than merely sufficiently flourishing. But, I argue below, if the interest 
in parenting is, in fact, substitutable, (Shields subscribes to this claim in 
2016c), or if one endorses a sufficientarian view of justice (as Shields does 
in the book), it becomes impossible to explain what is wrong with denying 
prospective non-optimal parents the right to acquire custody. This has 
direct implications for allocating custody to adoptive parents and to 
settling custody disputes between individuals, none of whom is already 
attached to the child whose custody is disputed. It also has implications 
about any entitlement that individuals may have to become parents via 
subsidized IVF treatments.
To elaborate, most of us now believe that children are our moral equals 
except from the fact that their lack of full autonomy makes paternalistic 
behavior towards them permissible (indeed, required). If so, then exercising 
authority over children must be justified by appeal to their consent or by 
appeal to their own interests but not, usually, by appeal to the interests of 
those who exercise the authority. Children cannot give valid consent. 
Therefore authority over them cannot be denied to those likely to advance 
their interests as much as possible for the sake of advancing the interest of 
other prospective authority-holders. Parents have undeniable, and great, 




Sufficientarian Parenting Must be Child-Centered
power over their children. Therefore (and assuming that it is impermissible 
to coerce people into the parenting role), it follows that custody ought to be 
allocated to the best available parent. This is the core of a child-centered 
account of the right to parent (Vallentyne 2003). One dual-interest theory 
attempts to resist this conclusion by claiming that many, or most, people, 
can only have fully flourishing lives if they have a chance to parent 
(Brighouse and Swift 2006; 2014). Another version of the dual-interest 
account explains departures form a child-centered account by noting that 
“child” and “parent” are periods within the life of the same individuals, 
and claiming that the loss that we incur as children by having non-optimal 
parents is more than made up for by the gains we enjoy by having the right 
to parent (Clayton 2006). This can be true only if the interest in parenting 
is indeed weighty and non-substitutable; otherwise, it seems more efficient 
to provide would-be sub-optimal parents with opportunities other than to 
a right to parent. Further, dual-interest theorists are egalitarians: Brighouse 
and Swift believe that justice entitles all of us to equal opportunities to 
have fully flourishing lives, and Clayton thinks that we ought to have equal 
opportunities to pursue our life plans. Therefore, all prospective adequate 
parents have a fundamental right to parent because, without it, individuals 
whose full flourishing or life plans require an opportunity to parent would 
be unjustly disadvantaged. A fundamental right to parent is grounded in 
the prospective parents’ own interest and therefore the right holders 
cannot be denied custody in order to better advance children’s interests 
(assuming an even better parent is available) or third parties’ interests.
The above argumentative strategy is not open to Shields for two reasons, 
each of which is enough to show that he cannot endorse a dual-interest 
account. First, although he believes that the interest in parenting has 
significant weight, Shields denies that parenting is a non-substitutable 
path to flourishing (Shields 2016b; 2016c). Even on the assumption that the 
interest is non-substitutable, it is far from clear that it can justify a right: 
there may be several non-substitutable ways to flourishing, which are such 
that we cannot pursue all of them within a lifetime. The way in which you 
flourish through parenting cannot be substituted by the way in which you 
flourish by traveling the world for much of your adult years, or by the way 
in which you flourish by dedicating your life to doing the most good you 
can do, for example. But, unfortunately, you may be unable to do more 
than one of those things in your life. In that case, achievable full flourishing 
need not involve the pursuit of every non-substitutable path to flourishing. 
But if, in fact, the goods of parenting can be substituted, then it is quite 
clear that preventing an individual from parenting will not necessarily 
prevent her flourishing: she can always find alternative ways to flourishing, 
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that do not require exercising authority over another human being.
Second, and more importantly perhaps, Shields is not an egalitarian, 
but a sufficientarian. Even egalitarians like Brighouse and Swift may have 
trouble justifying a fundamental right to parent. One can doubt that the 
interest in parenting they identify (assuming it is indeed very weighty and 
non-substitutable) can generate a fundamental right to parent. A reason is 
that there may simply not be enough resources to go around such that we 
all have opportunities to have fully flourishing lives (Gheaus 2015). In this 
case we are not entitled to an opportunity to a fully flourishing life even on 
an egalitarian account; on a sufficientarian one, we aren’t anyway. Another 
reason to be skeptical of the egalitarian version of the dual-interest 
accounts of the right to parent, and even more so of the sufficientarian 
version, is that it mandates an otherwise impermissible exercise of 
authority. We usually do not think that we should allow person A to exercise 
authority over person B for the sake of person A’s interest even if there is no 
other way to bring person A to the level of flourishing or opportunities to 
which she is entitled by justice. That our intuitions diverge from this 
standard when it comes to exercising authority over children might be due 
to empirical facts which explain why adequate birth parents have a right to 
parent in most cases (Gheaus 2012; 2015) or to the long tradition of denying 
children full moral status (Gheaus 2018). Even the egalitarian version of 
the dual-interest account may be in trouble. But if sufficientarians are 
right and we are only entitled to enough, it is even less credible that we can 
make a derogation from the general way in which we usually think about 
legitimizing authority.
4. CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, if children have full moral status, that is, if they have rights/are 
recipients of duties of justice, then it is difficult to see why we should allow 
sub-optimal parents to control children’s lives, unless two conditions are 
jointly met:
a. equality, rather than sufficiency, is the correct principle of justice;
and
b. there is a weighty and non-substitutable interest to parent, the 
fulfillment of which is necessary for full flourishing.
Shields denies both the first and the second conditions above (in 2016a 
and 2016b, respectively). He also wants to defend the following claim: 
“in respect of deciding on the custodial arrangements of a child, the 
child’s interests have some priority over the parent’s interests until they 
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are met to a sufficient extent. Thereafter the parent’s interests matter 
more relative to the child’s interests. This yields the following guidance: 
so long as a parent will perform well enough with respect to the child’s 
interests, we cannot usually remove the child from that parent’s 
custody”. (Shields 2016a: 122)
I agree with his judgement of when a custody changes are legitimate, 
but for reasons different from those he advances. If Shields is right about 
sufficientarianism being the correct principle of justice, then it seems that 
he – like other sufficientarians – should embrace a child-centered account 
about the acquisition of the right to parent. The alternative would be to 
adopt a dual-interest account by denying children’s full moral status, and 
that, I assume, is unappealing.
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